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Reward choice – employees' ability to exercise control over the formal rewards they receive from 
work – is an important part of many HRM strategies. Reward choice is expected to increase 
employee performance, but conflicting findings highlight the need to better understand how and 
when it will do so. Based on fairness heuristic theory, we predicted that procedural justice 
mediates reward choice's influence on performance, and that choice attractiveness moderates that 
influence. A field study and an experiment both had similar results, supporting our predictions. 
Reward choice can increase performance by as much as 40 per cent, but only when the available 
choices are attractive to employees. 
 






An increasingly popular HRM strategy is giving employees reward choice, which provides 
employees with the ability to choose the level or type of rewards they receive from work (Miceli 
and Heneman, 2000; White, 2009; IOMA, 2011). In the US, for example, fewer than 20 major 
employers allowed workers any control over how they were rewarded in 1980 (Hewitt 
Associates, 1993), but almost all major employers were offering some reward choice by 2007 
(Employee Benefits, 2007). The use of reward choice in other countries shows the same 
increasing trend (Rao, 2008; Koo, 2011). Allowing employees to exercise some control over the 
nature of their rewards has become an important part of many organisations' HRM strategy. 
 
Organisations appear to have embraced reward choice for two reasons: to control costs by only 
providing those rewards that employees actually value, and to benefit from improvements in 
workers' attitudes and behaviour (Kelliher and Anderson, 2008; Lovewell, 2010). The use of 
choice reflects the fact that the traditional approach of offering standardised rewards has not 
succeeded in controlling costs or enhancing performance; such generic reward plans have tended 
to produce poor results (Beer and Cannon, 2004; Chiang and Birtch, 2006). Reward choice 
allows organisations to provide rewards that are customised to the individual, and is believed to 
help when competing to recruit and retain the best employees, as well as contributing to their 
subsequent performance (Fay and Thompson, 2001; Koo, 2011; Nazir et al., 2012). Consistent 
with the belief that reward choice benefits the worker and the organisation, scholarship has 
linked reward choice with both increased task performance and performance-related attitudes, 
such as organisational commitment (Lawler and Hackman, 1969; Cooper et al., 1992; Cole and 
Flint, 2004). 
 
However, despite the widespread use of reward choice and research evidence of its effect on 
performance, two important gaps remain in the literature. The first gap concerns the mechanism 
linking reward choice to performance, which has remained unknown. The second gap concerns 
anecdotal and empirical evidence suggesting that employers do not always get a positive 
response from introducing reward choice (Sullivan, 2009; IOMA, 2011; Shreeram, 2012). While 
some studies have found a positive relationship between reward choice and performance (Lawler 
and Hackman, 1969; Cooper et al., 1992), at least one study (Morgeson et al., 2001) found that 
reward choice was not beneficial. It seems that reward choice can improve employee 
performance, but does not always do so. As such, the crucial next step for theory and practice 
lies in understanding how reward choice affects performance, including the mediating 
mechanism and boundary conditions. 
 
In service of this goal, we report two studies that answer the two research questions: What is the 
mediator of the relationship between reward choice and work performance? and What are the 
boundary conditions of this relationship? Study 1 used a field survey to extend previous research 
by showing that reward choice influences performance-related attitudes through the mediating 
mechanism of procedural justice. Study 2 used an experimental design to replicate the Study 
1 findings and to examine boundary conditions for reward choice. Study 2 found that reward 
attractiveness is an important moderator of the effect of reward choice (i.e. reward choice only 
increases justice and performance if the available choices are attractive). 
 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
 
To study the relationship between reward choice and performance, we used the total rewards 
perspective (Nazir et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2014). This perspective defines rewards to include all 
of the valued outcomes that employees derive from their work, including base pay, incentives, 
non-salary benefits and perquisites (Fay and Thompson, 2001; Gross and Friedman, 2004; 
Chiang and Birtch, 2006). Focusing on an employee's total rewards is consistent with larger 
trends in the study of HRM, which are recognising the need to move towards more holistic views 
(Boxall, 2013). The total rewards perspective is based on the fact that different employees value 
different types of rewards (Kinnie et al., 2005; Krausert, 2014), but their response to having their 
desires satisfied will be similar. For example, imagine one worker who desires more pay, and 
another who is most concerned with flexible work arrangements. Giving both workers the same 
reward (e.g. more pay) would provoke differing responses, but if each worker is given what s/he 
desires, s/he should have similarly positive responses (Cable and Edwards, 2004). The total 
rewards perspective focuses on compensation practices in general, so as to accommodate such 
diversity in the workforce. 
 
Reward choice and performance 
 
Organisations are increasingly offering customised total rewards by allowing workers to control 
some aspects of the level or type of rewards they receive. The specifics of the reward choice vary 
from simple forms such as choosing among different package options to situations where an 
employee's entire reward package is idiosyncratic (e.g. Anand et al., 2010). Providing employees 
with reward choice is expected to reduce organisational costs, increase worker satisfaction and 
improve worker performance (Kelliher and Anderson, 2008; Lovewell, 2010). The first two 
effects of reward choice – reduced cost and increased reward satisfaction – are straightforward. It 
has been documented that introducing reward choice decreases the cost of reward provision 
while simultaneously increasing workers' satisfaction (Karoly and Panis, 2004; 
Dencker et al., 2007). 
 
Beyond these two effects, however, there is some evidence that reward choice can also improve 
performance. For example, one study found that workers who designed their own reward system 
performed better than workers who had an identical reward system imposed on them 
(Cooper et al., 1992). Cooper et al. (1992) speculated that reward choice will increase 
performance when rewards are perceived as fair, and that having workers involved in designing 
the reward system leads to perceptions of fairness. 
 
Other findings also fit with the hypothesis that reward choice promotes perceptions of fairness. 
One study showed that workers perceived a reward system as less fair, less responsive, less 
motivating and less satisfying when that system was created exclusively by management, rather 
than through a joint management–union effort (Schwarz, 1989). Similarly, another study found 
that allowing workers to design their own reward system made workers more trusting of 
management (Jenkins and Lawler, 1981). 
 
In contrast, however, one study failed to find any benefit from designing a new reward system 
(Morgeson et al., 2001): workers were extensively involved in providing information about 
reward preferences to management, but showed no positive response to the new rewards. 
Although Morgeson et al. (2001) admitted surprise at this outcome, we submit that it reflects the 
difference between choice and participation (Leana et al., 1990). In most studies of reward 
choice, the comparison is between one group of workers who designed their own reward system 
and another group of workers who had a system imposed on them. As such, these studies 
confounded participation (i.e. having voice or giving input about preferred options) with choice 
(i.e. making the actual reward selection). The studies that found positive responses compared 
‘participation + choice’ to ‘no-participation + no-choice’. In contrast, Morgeson et al. (2001) 
compared ‘participation + no-choice’ to ‘no-participation + no-choice’: some workers in their 
study gave input, but the final system was chosen by management. That Morgeson et al. (2001) 
found no positive outcomes suggests that workers respond to choosing their rewards, rather than 
to participating in a process where someone else ultimately chooses. Choice is the key factor. 
 
Additional evidence for the importance of choice was provided by a field experiment where 
some autonomous work groups were able to design their own reward plan, while control groups 
had an identical plan imposed on them by management (Lawler and Hackman, 1969). The initial 
results of Lawler and Hackman's (1969) field experiment were consistent with other work in this 
domain, showing that workers in the reward choice condition significantly increased their 
performance-related behaviours while those in the control (no choice) condition did not. While 
this design initially was like others in confounding participation and choice, a longitudinal 
component of the study indirectly separated the two elements. 
 
Follow-up data collected by Scheflen et al. (1971) a year after the reward redesign revealed two 
important findings. The first finding was that the behavioural change lasted for a year; it was not 
a short-term result. The second finding was that losing the chosen reward system reversed the 
benefits associated with it. After the first year, management at the organisation discontinued the 
worker-designed reward plan. However, the removal of the plan did not reduce workers' rewards; 
in fact, management raised overall compensation levels, so that workers were making more than 
they were under the employee-designed plan (Scheflen et al., 1971). Nonetheless, when the 
reward system changed, performance behaviours reverted to pre-experiment levels. The study 
did not measure the mechanism involved, but when considered with the results of 
Morgeson et al. (2001) it seems likely that losing the feeling of choice was crucial. The change 
was not caused by the level of reward, since the workers' rewards actually increased when their 
plan was removed. The element that changed was that the workers no longer had a reward plan 
they had chosen for themselves. 
 
In summary, it is clear that allowing workers to design their own reward system can improve 
performance. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the choice exercised in system design is 
the key to increasing worker performance (Fang and Gerhart, 2012). Changes in the level of 
rewards do not account for observed performance gains, nor is it sufficient to participate in the 
design if someone else chooses what rewards are received. 
 
An important limitation of previous studies is that they examined choice in the context of 
employees designing their own reward system. Obviously, such complete system design involves 
a sweeping change, and of necessity cannot occur often. Nonetheless, the underlying mechanism 
of positive responses to choice suggests that performance should be improved even if reward 
choice is less sweeping than designing the entire system. We, therefore, propose the constructive 
replication hypothesis that reward choice will increase performance, regardless of the scope of 
change.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Reward choice increases worker performance. 
 
Reward choice, procedural justice and performance 
 
Stating the hypothesis that reward choice will increase performance begs the question of why. 
Drawing on fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001; Lind et al., 2001), we posit that procedural 
justice is the mediating mechanism linking reward choice to worker performance. We begin by 
defining procedural justice, and then use fairness heuristic theory to explain why reward choice 
will increase procedural justice and why procedural justice will increase performance. 
 
Organisational justice is defined as an individual's perception of fairness in an organisation (Lind 
and Tyler, 1988), and while multiple types of justice have been found (Colquitt et al., 2012) the 
most relevant to reward choice are distributive justice and procedural justice. Distributive justice 
refers to workers' evaluation of whether the results of a decision are fair (Konovsky, 2000). For 
example, workers may judge whether the organisation is contributing an appropriate amount 
towards their retirement savings. In contrast, procedural justice concerns workers' evaluation of 
the process used to reach an outcome, distinct from the outcome itself (Thibaut and 
Walker, 1975). In the retirement contribution example, procedural justice would involve 
workers' views about the fairness of how contribution amounts were calculated (e.g. more for 
employees with greater seniority, maximum amount limits). 
 
Procedural justice is usually more important than distributive justice (Colquitt, 2001). That is, 
workers will often accept a relatively poor outcome if they believe it was produced by a fair 
process (Van den Bos et al., 2001). Moreover, one of the key contributors to perceptions of fair 
process is the power to choose (Lind et al., 1990; Korsgaard and Roberson, 1995). As a result, 
procedural justice should be the most important issue in the context of reward choice. Indeed, 
prior study has shown that reward choice contributes to perceptions of justice in the reward 
system (Cole and Flint, 2004). In other words, if employees can choose their rewards, they will 
perceive those rewards as more procedurally just. 
 
Furthermore, fairness heuristic theory suggests that workers' perceptions of the reward system's 
fairness will generalise to their perception of the organisation as a whole (Lind, 2001; 
Lind et al., 2001; Mignonac and Richebe, 2013). Fairness heuristic theory explains that particular 
occasions of fair treatment lead individuals to assume that those occasions reflect the overall 
level of fairness in the organisation. If the organisation acts justly in important and salient 
situations, then the individual will tend to assume that the organisation is fair in general. Because 
of how important rewards are to workers, judgements about the fairness of the reward system 
should be particularly influential in shaping overall perceptions of the organisation. As such, 
reward choice should contribute to generalised perceptions of procedural justice among workers: 
having reward choice will lead to perceptions of justice in the reward system, and evaluations of 
the reward system will be generalised to the organisation as a whole (Thibaut and Walker, 1975; 
Tyler, 1987). 
 
Workers who believe their organisation is procedurally just subsequently believe that there is 
greater interpersonal trust between themselves and the organisation, and that trust motivates 
them to behave in a cooperative and supportive fashion (Lynch et al., 1999; Cropanzano 
et al., 2001). Individuals who feel fairly treated take more action to support the common good 
(Tyler and Blader, 2003). When workers believe their organisation is just, they are more willing 
to contribute (Grover and Crooker, 1995; Lind, 2001) and their contributions improve 
performance (Konovsky, 2000; Colquitt et al., 2012). As such, procedural justice should be the 
mechanism by which reward choice increases performance.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Procedural justice mediates the effect of reward choice on worker 
performance, such that reward choice increases procedural justice and procedural 
justice increases worker performance. 
 
Choice attractiveness: a boundary condition 
 
Given the evidence that having choice increases perceptions of justice (Lind et al., 1990; 
Korsgaard and Roberson, 1995), one might assume that any reward choice would increase justice 
and subsequent performance. However, research in psychology shows that offering choice does 
not always produce positive responses (Chua and Iyengar, 2006). For example, Botti and Iyengar 
(2004) found that if individuals could only choose among meal options that they found 
unappealing, the freedom to choose actually reduced their satisfaction with the meal. Extending 
these results to the domain of work rewards suggests that not any choice will do; the available 
options must be attractive to workers. 
 
For example, imagine an organisation that offers only unsatisfactory reward choices to 
employees. While the workers will be able to exercise reward choice, there is no reason to think 
that doing so will improve their perception of the reward system in this hypothetical 
organisation. Being compelled to choose among a series of unattractive options will not 
contribute to perceptions of procedural justice, and is more likely to focus employee attention on 
the poor level of their benefits (Colquitt, 2001). Since perceptions of an organisation's overall 
justice depend on perceptions in specific circumstances, the organisation that only offers choice 
among unattractive options will not be perceived as more procedurally just in general. Since the 
performance gains associated with reward choice derive from generalised perceptions of 
procedural justice, offering reward choice among unattractive options will therefore fail to 
improve performance. Consistent with this prediction, media reports have noted some overtly 
negative responses to reward choice (Shreeram, 2012). Offering reward choice does not 
guarantee positive results; it is necessary to offer attractive choices.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Choice among unattractive rewards does not increase procedural justice.  
 






Sample and procedure 
 
One hundred full-time workers were randomly selected from the alumni database of a large 
Midwestern American university master's programme and invited to complete an online survey. 
Forty-six workers provided usable responses, representing a range of industries and job 
functions. The respondents were primarily young professionals (mean age = 30.47 years, SD 
6.02). All had graduate-level education, and most had recently been promoted (mean job 
tenure = 2.30 years, SD 1.63; mean organisational tenure = 4.11 years, SD 3.79); 57 per cent of 
the participants were male. More than half (54 per cent) had supervisory duties (mean number of 




To measure reward choice, respondents were asked to describe the two most important rewards 
they received from their employer. For each of those rewards, they reported the extent of their 
reward choice in terms of degree of choice, satisfaction with degree of choice and quality of 
available choices on five-point scales. We combined these six items (three items × two rewards) 
into a reward choice measure that had good internal consistency (α = 0.80, 95 per cent CI [0.59, 
1.00]). 
 
Because objective performance measures would not be comparable across our sample, we used 
affective organisational commitment (Meyer et al., 1993) as a proxy measure for performance 
(six items, e.g. “I really feel as if this organisation's problems are my own”). Affective 
organisational commitment refers to a psychological state of positive attitudes towards 
continuing one's relationship with an organisation; workers are affectively committed to an 
organisation to the extent that they identify themselves with that organisation and feel an 
emotional attachment to their membership (Meyer and Allen, 1991). Affective organisational 
commitment is not a measure of performance, but it is the type of commitment most strongly 
associated with performance (Meyer et al., 2002), and meta-analysis has revealed a consistent 
positive relationship between affective commitment and performance (Riketta, 2002). In 
particular, when individuals are relatively new to their job – as was the sample used here – the 
meta-analytic correlation between affective commitment and performance is 0.44 (Wright and 
Bonett, 2002). Moreover, organisational commitment has been shown to mediate the relationship 
between rewards and performance (Park and Kruse, 2014). 
 
Participants also completed Colquitt's (2001) scale measuring procedural justice (seven 
items, e.g. “To what extent are the procedures use in the organisation free of bias?”), as well as 
items about their demographic characteristics. In addition, to control for different levels of 
rewards among participants, we had them report their overall satisfaction with the perceived 
value of the rewards provided by their employer (benefit level, four items, e.g. “How satisfied 
are you with the value of your benefits?”; Williams et al., 2008). 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Based on responses to demographic questions, respondents did not appear to differ from non-
respondents. Demographic characteristics largely proved to be non-significant control variables, 
and even when they were significant their inclusion did not change any of the substantive 
conclusions. As such, demographic variables were excluded for clarity and parsimony (Aguinis 
and Vandenberg, 2014). Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for Study 1a  
Variable Mean SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Reward choice 3.88 0.92 0.80 
         
2 Affective organisational commitment 3.20 0.93 0.81 0.33 
        
3 Procedural justice 3.43 0.95 0.85 0.40 0.58 
       
4 Reward-level satisfaction 3.72 0.91 0.95 0.69 0.16 0.34 
      
5 Organisational size (thousands of employees) 24.40 53.78 
 
0.11 0.22 0.19 0.23 
     
6 Number of hierarchical levels from respondent to the top of the organisation 4.61 2.29 
 
0.14 −0.17 −0.14 0.08 0.34 
    
7 Gender (1 = male; 0 = female) 0.59 0.50 
 
−0.26 −0.26 −0.32 −0.26 0.19 0.32 
   
8 Age (years) 30.48 6.08 
 
0.18 0.09 0.17 0.21 0.02 −0.10 0.13 
  
9 Organisational tenure (years) 4.15 3.82 
 
0.19 0.37 0.36 0.17 0.54 −0.03 0.17 0.40 
 
10 Tenure in current position (years) 2.31 1.64 
 
0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12 −0.08 −0.35 0.19 0.22 0.32 
a n = 46. Correlations with an absolute value greater than 0.30 were significant (p < 0.05). 
 













Reward choice 0.33a [0.04, 0.62] 0.41a [0.12, 0.70] 0.11 [−0.16, 0.39] 0.25 [−0.11, 0.60] 
Procedural justice 
  
0.53a [0.26, 0.79] 0.54a [0.28, 0.81] 
Reward-level satisfaction 
   
−0.20 [−0.55, 0.15] 
Constant 1.92a 1.83a 0.96 1.15 
R2 0.11 0.16 0.35 0.37 
F 5.28a (df 1, 44) 8.30a (df 1, 44) 11.62a (df 2, 43) 8.28a (df 3, 42) 
a p < 0.05. 
b 95% confidence interval in brackets; n = 46. 
 
We used ordinary least squares regression for our primary analyses. Consistent with Hypothesis 
1, reward choice was related to affective organisational commitment (Model 1 in Table 2). 
Furthermore, consistent with Hypothesis 2, procedural justice mediated the relationship between 
reward choice and affective organisational commitment. Reward choice predicted procedural 
justice (Model 2), and when controlling for the relationship between procedural justice and 
affective organisational commitment there was no consistent relationship between reward choice 
and affective commitment (Model 3). To further assess mediation, we conducted two additional 
tests: a bootstrap estimation (Preacher and Hayes, 2008) revealed a standardised indirect effect of 
0.23 (95 per cent CI [0.03, 0.46]), and a Sobel (1982) test found a significant effect 
(z = 2.24, p = 0.02, 95 per cent CI [0.04, 0.40]). All of these results are consistent 
with Hypothesis 2, the prediction that procedural justice mediates the relationship between 
reward choice and affective organisational commitment. 
 
To provide a conservative test of our predictions, we also conducted several additional analyses. 
First, we estimated a model that included the control variable for how satisfied individuals were 
with their level of rewards (Model 4). This analysis revealed that the relationship between 
procedural justice and performance remained after controlling for the level of rewards. Second, 
we estimated alternative models using Huber, bi-square and sandwich corrections, which can 
improve model estimates in the presence of outliers or heteroscedasticity (Huber, 1981). In all 
cases, the results were substantively unchanged. Moreover, post hoc diagnostics revealed that 
collinearity was not a concern; the largest variance inflation factor was only 2.0 (O'Brien, 2007). 
Additionally, power analysis revealed an observed statistical power greater than 0.9, which 
exceeds the traditional 0.8 guideline required for appropriate hypothesis testing (Cohen, 1988). 
Taken together, all of these results suggest the robustness of the findings. 
 
In sum, using a diverse sample of full-time workers, we found results consistent with prior 
research: reward choice was associated with higher levels of the performance-related attitude of 
affective organisational commitment. Also consistent with previous studies 
(e.g. Tremblay et al., 1998), the effect of reward choice was independent of the level of the 
reward. In addition to replicating previous results, these findings extended previous work in two 
important ways. First, where previous studies were conducted primarily with first-level workers, 
the majority of our respondents were managers or supervisors. The results, therefore, suggest that 
reward choice has similar effects across hierarchical levels. Second, our results showed that the 
effect of reward choice was mediated by procedural justice. This finding is consistent with the 
long-standing, but previously untested, prediction that reward choice improves performance by 
fostering perceptions of fairness. 
 
Nonetheless, Study 1 had three limitations. First, it used affective organisational commitment as 
a proxy, rather than measuring performance directly. Second, it used cross-sectional data, which 
prevents us from ruling out alternative explanations (e.g. committed employees may be more 
likely to perceive the organisation as fair). And finally, the data did not allow a test of the 
moderating effect of choice attractiveness. Moreover, the reward choices that the respondents 
reported on were primarily non-salary benefits, rather than choice about pay. To address these 






Sample and procedure 
 
Eighty-two undergraduate business majors at a large Midwestern American university 
participated. Their mean age was 20.5 years (SD 1.61) and 47.5 per cent were male. 
 
After providing consent, participants were told about the task and how they would be rewarded 
(i.e. the experimental manipulation); they then completed the procedural justice measure 
from Study 1, and finally completed the compound remote associates task (CRA). In the CRA, 
participants try to find one word that can be combined with each of three different prompt words 
to create meaningful compound terms. For example, the prompt ‘night/wrist/stop’ is solved by 
the word ‘watch’, which can combine with each of the three prompts. Participants were 
presented with 140 sets of prompts (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003) and directed to complete 
as many as they could. The CRA was originally developed as a measure of creativity 
(Mednick, 1962), but recent research treats the task as an assessment of problem-solving ability 
that does not require domain-specific knowledge (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003). As such, 
the CRA is considered a good measure of abstract knowledge-based work performance 
(Ackerman and Zalmanov, 2012). 
 
Reward choice was manipulated as a three-level, between-subjects factor (attractive choices, less 
attractive choices, no choice), derived from a two-phase pretest. In the first phase of pretesting, a 
sample of 43 participants was shown a list of 14 possible rewards for completing an experiment, 
and asked to rate each reward's attractiveness. In the second phase of pretesting, a different 
sample of 31 participants rated the overall attractiveness of the three highest rated rewards from 
phase 1 (set A) and the three lowest rated rewards from phase 1 (set B). Set A was rated as 
significantly more attractive than set B, regardless of presentation order [M = 4.68 vs. 2.32 on a 
seven-point scale, paired t(31) = 8.56, p < 0.01]. 
 
The options in the attractive choices condition were the following: (a) two points of extra 
credit + $0.10 cash per correct answer; (b) two points of extra credit + $0.10 per correct answer 
donated to a charity of their choice; (c) $0.30 cash per correct answer (no extra credit); or (d) two 
points of extra credit (the university's standard experimental reward). The options in the less 
attractive choices condition were the following: (a) $0.20 cash per correct answer (no extra 
credit); (b) two points of extra credit + $0.13 in fast food coupons per correct answer; (c) two 
points of extra credit + $0.13 donated to the Humane Society per correct answer; or (d) two 
points of extra credit + $0.10 cash per correct answer. The first three of the less attractive options 
were the set rated least attractive in pretesting (i.e. set B); the fourth was the same as the first 
attractive choices option and was the single option judged most attractive in pretesting. We 
offered this single, highly attractive option with the three less attractive rewards to control for the 
effects of reward content, as described below. 
 
After learning about the task, participants in the attractive choices and less attractive choices 
conditions chose their reward from the appropriate list. All but three of the attractive choices 
participants chose the same reward, and all of the less attractive choices participants chose that 
same reward. Therefore, participants in the no choice condition were told that they would receive 
that reward: two points of extra credit + $0.10 cash per correct answer. To prevent any effect 
from reward content, the three participants who chose a different reward were not included in the 
data set (final n: attractive = 27, less attractive = 25, no choice = 30). As such, all participants 
operated under an identical reward structure; the only difference among groups was whether they 
had it imposed on them or chose it from a list of otherwise attractive or less attractive options. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
As in Study 1, demographic variables were non-significant covariates. The mean CRA 
performance was 30.8 correct responses (SD 17.88), the mean level of procedural justice was 
3.92 on a five-point scale (SD 0.74), and these two variables were significantly correlated 
(r = 0.25, p = 0.02). Consistent with Study 1, reward choice increased performance [F(2, 
79) = 5.22, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.12) and procedural justice [F(2, 79) = 4.54, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.10]. 
 
Planned contrasts supported both Hypotheses 3 and 4-Hypotheses 3 and 4 (see Table 3). 
Participants in the attractive choices condition reported greater procedural justice (M = 4.26) than 
those in the no choice condition (M = 3.74; t = 2.74, p < 0.01), and greater procedural justice than 
those in the less attractive choices condition (M = 3.77; t = 2.47, p = 0.02). There was no 
significant difference in reported procedural justice between the no choice and less attractive 
choices conditions (t = 0.15, p = 0.88). As one would expect, given the mediating role of 
procedural justice, the results were similar for performance. Participants in the attractive choices 
condition (M = 39.26) performed 39.6 per cent better than participants in the no choice condition 
(M = 28.13; t = 2.46, p = 0.02) and 57.8 per cent better than participants in the less attractive 
choices condition (M = 24.88; t = 3.04, p < 0.01). There was no statistically significant difference 
in performance between the no choice and less attractive choices conditions (t = 0.71, p = 0.48). 
 
Table 3. Group means for Study 2a  
No choice Less attractive choices Attractive choices 
Performance (correct CRA answers) 28.13 24.88 39.26 
Procedural justice 3.74 3.77 4.26 
a No choice n = 30, less attractive choices n = 25, attractive choices n = 27. 
CRA, compound remote associates. 
 
In sum, reward choice increased performance and perceptions of procedural justice, but only 
when the choice was made from attractive options. These results extended our previous study's 
findings in three important ways. They replicated them in a different context, they generalised 
them to a different criterion variable, which was an objective measure of task performance, and 
they provided a clear demonstration of the causal effect of reward choice. 
 
Providing one attractive option in the less attractive choices condition was necessary to control 
for the effects of reward content, but it may have led participants to perceive this condition as 
effectively offering no choice, since only one option was attractive. This could explain the 
comparable results between the less attractive choices and no choice groups. It may be that if the 





In two studies, we examined the relationship between reward choice and performance. 
Consistent with predictions, reward choice increased performance through the mediating effect 
of procedural justice. Workers provided with reward choice perceived their organisation as more 
fair, and that perception of fairness led to improved performance. Our results showed that the 
effect of reward choice on performance is independent of the actual level of reward, but does 
depend on choice attractiveness. Workers offered a choice among unattractive options did not 
perceive greater procedural justice nor did their performance improve; only those choosing from 
multiple attractive options had perceptions of greater procedural justice and subsequent 
performance gains. Our data combined experimental and field observations, showing consistency 
across diverse contexts, tasks and measures. As a result, our research design provides strong 





The results make three theoretical contributions. The first is to demonstrate the previously 
uncertain mediator of the effect of reward choice on performance. HRM suffers from a lack of 
theoretical explanations for observed results (Monks et al., 2013) and poor evidence of the causal 
nature of observed associations (Guest, 2011). Our data address both of these issues. Prior to our 
research, there were no data on the mediated process by which reward choice influences 
performance. Allowing workers to create their own reward system had been shown to enhance 
performance (Lawler and Hackman, 1969; Cooper et al., 1992), but the explanation for this result 
remained unclear. We advanced this work by testing the effects of reward choice in different 
contexts, with different outcomes and different types of choice, while measuring the mediating 
mechanism. As a result, we extended and clarified those previous studies, confirming that 
perceptions of fairness – specifically of procedural justice – are the mechanism by which reward 
choice improves performance. Moreover, our use of both field and experimental data supports 
inferences of cause: choice is the causal agent. 
 
The second contribution arises from clearly distinguishing between choice and participation 
(Barber et al., 1992). Previous studies confounded these two factors, which led to some 
apparently anomalous findings (Morgeson et al., 2001). Our results appear to resolve the 
anomaly, creating consensus in the literature. In our studies, workers had choice (i.e. they could 
decide what type or level of reward they received), but they did not participate in creating those 
choices. We found that choice improved performance, while previous studies found that the 
combination of choice and participation improved performance (Lawler and Hackman, 1969; 
Cooper et al., 1992). Combining these results with the observed lack of benefit among 
employees who had participation without choice (Morgeson et al., 2001) suggests that choice, 
not participation, is essential. As such, Morgeson et al.'s (2001) results are consistent with 
previous work, so long as one distinguishes between choice and participation. Nonetheless, 
opportunities remain for further investigation. While choosing among predefined options is 
sufficient to improve performance, future scholarship can investigate whether the benefits are 
greater when choice is combined with participation (Deci and Ryan, 2000). 
 
The third contribution of our work is to highlight the complexities of choice, and thereby identify 
a significant boundary condition to the benefits of reward choice. Research in other contexts has 
shown that choice is not unequivocally regarded as good (Iyengar et al., 2004), and we likewise 
found that in the case of work rewards not any choice will do. Reward choice only improved 
performance when individuals perceived their choice options as attractive ones. As such, the 
preferences of workers will be an important consideration in future investigations of reward 
systems and reward choice. All choice options will not have equivalent effects, suggesting an 




Our findings suggest several related considerations for implementation. In discussing these, it 
should be recalled that others found that the effects of reward choice persisted among employees 
for more than a year (e.g. Scheflen et al., 1971). In the long run, the performance-enhancing 
consequences of reward choice may be substantial, which makes this issue an important one. 
 
The most salient element of our findings is that choice is sufficient to improve performance. 
Before our research, one might have inferred from the literature that performance gains required 
allowing employees to design their own reward system, which would be impractical in many 
contexts. Our results show that reward design is not necessary. It is enough for management to 
have workers choose among attractive options. Doing so improved performance in our study by 
almost 40 per cent, compared with workers who had no choice. However, reward attractiveness 
is an important contingency; there were no benefits from choice among unattractive options. 
Organisations must ensure that the rewards offered meet not only their own needs, but also those 
of the employees. It may be best to have workers participate in identifying reward options to 
ensure that the results are sufficiently attractive. In addition, whatever system is used, it will be 
crucial to evaluate it in terms of employee perception and response (Corby et al., 2005). 
 
In addition, organisational assistance may be required for the successful implementation of 
reward choice. In practice, it will likely not be enough to simply provide choice. For example, 
many organisations have moved from defined benefit pensions to defined contribution plans, and 
while this move clearly gives workers more reward choice it may not contribute to their 
perceptions of organisational justice, particularly since prior work has shown that many 
individuals make poor choices for their retirement (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007). Workers may 




It seems obvious that the type of rewards provided would influence employees' attitudes and 
behaviour. Our findings support this intuition, but further demonstrate that rewards have an 
effect beyond just their level. We integrated and extended previous studies by showing that being 
able to choose how one is rewarded has potentially powerful implications for organisational 
outcomes. Providing workers with choice over their rewards can lead them to feel more fairly 
treated, and thus to provide better performance. This observation clarifies decades of prior 
research and, we hope, provides a foundation and stimulus for future investigation of the 
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